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COURT REFORM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Margaret Y.K. Woo† 
 
Abstract:   In Court Reform on Trial: Why Simple Solutions Fail, Malcolm Feeley 
identified a number of obstacles that undermine reforms of the United States court system.  
Feeley’s proposed solution was to adopt a problem-oriented “rights strategy”—letting the 
courts themselves solve their problems through litigation.  This is because litigation is a 
forum in which courts are well placed to identify specific problems and devise pragmatic 
solutions.  This Article takes a look at this proposition in the context of court reforms in 
China and concludes that courts (and law) are also a reflection of national goals and identity.  
Any reforms to a court system must not only take into consideration expectations and 
realistic goals, but also the fundamental identity of a particular legal system.  In a top-down 
society like China, national goals—and hence, national identity—are defined by the 
Chinese Communist Party.  Chinese courts have come a long way in their reforms and 
court reforms in China have often been couched in the language of national goals.  Any 
proposed court reforms that challenge national goals and identity are doomed to fail. 
 
Cite as: Margaret Woo, Court Reform with Chinese Characteristics, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 
241 (2017). 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The primary problems of the courts are . . . due to changes 
brought about by raised standards and increased attention . . . 
politicians, the press, the scholarly community, and the courts 
themselves have . . . fostered unrealistic expectations, and 
promoted bold but often empty solutions that are guaranteed to 
bring about disillusionment and disappointment even in the face 
of significant improvements.1 
 
Can courts be agents of their own change?  In his seminal book, Court 
Reform on Trial: Why Simple Solutions Fail, Malcolm Feeley identifies a 
number of obstacles that undermine reforms of the United States court system.  
These obstacles include diverse constituencies that have different and often 
conflicting expectations of the system, unattainable objectives, and the reality 
that courts in the United States lack a central authority or unified value system, 
and therefore are not easily susceptible to planned change.  Feeley’s proposed 
solution is to adopt a problem-oriented “rights strategy”—letting the courts 
themselves solve their problems through litigation because it is a forum 
through which courts are well placed to identify specific problems and devise 
pragmatic solutions.  It is a cautious call to value the incremental change 
                                                 
† Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Interdisciplinary Education at Northeastern 
University School of Law. 
1  MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL 3 (2013). 
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courts themselves can make. 
 
When viewed in the context of China, the question of whether courts 
can be agents of their own change is more complicated.  Feeley’s conclusions 
about court reforms ring true in some aspects, but raise questions in others.  
This Article examines the course of court reform in China and concludes that 
courts (and law) are also a reflection of national goals and identity.  Any 
reforms to a court system must not only take into consideration expectations 
and realistic goals, but also the fundamental identity of a particular legal 
system.  In a top-down society 2  like China, national goals—and hence, 
national identity—are defined by the Chinese Communist Party.  Chinese 
courts have come a long way in their reforms, and court reforms in China have 
often been couched in the language of national goals.  Any proposed changes 
that challenge national goals and identity set by the Party are doomed to fail. 
 
Indeed, law and courts have been featured in every stage of China’s 
transition from a planned to market economy.  Each major law reform remains 
part and parcel of China’s state building, containing provisions in each new 
version that reflect the current national goals.  From the first wave of law 
reforms in 1979 reestablishing the court system to the latest iteration creating 
“circuit courts,” each wave has been closely related to national goals and 
identities.  For a top-down regime like China, understanding court reforms 
may require placing courts in their broader political context rather than using 
a problem-oriented “rights strategy.”  This is consistent with the Chinese 
socialist view of law as instrumental in achieving certain substantive ends. 
 
As early as the 1970s, China resurrected its legal system as it moved 
from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and its years of isolation to join 
the world market economy.  At the start, China was very effective in 
bifurcating its legal system, with one track more consistent with 
international standards for commercial disputes involving foreign parties, 
and one more in line with Communist/traditional Chinese ideology for 
disputes involving domestic citizens. 3   Because foreign trading partners 
                                                 
2  The terms “top-down” and “bottom up” come from institutional economics. The top-down view of 
institutions sees them as determined by laws written by political leaders. The bottom-up view sees institutions 
as emerging spontaneously from the social norms, customs, traditions, beliefs, and values of individuals 
within a society, with the written law only formalizing what is already shaped by the attitudes of individuals. 
See generally William Easterly, Institutions: Top Down or Bottom Up?, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 95 (2008). 
3  See generally PITMAN POTTER, CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM (2013); CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN CHINA (Margaret Y.K. Woo & Mary E. Gallagher eds., 2011) [hereinafter CHINESE JUSTICE]; 
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were important to China’s economic development, China created a system 
that gave foreign partners comfort and stability, while keeping domestic 
citizens carefully in check.4 
 
Thus, to secure international investment, China developed an arbitral 
system for commercial disputes involving international parties that was based 
on international norms and customs and run by China’s International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission.5  The Chinese Arbitration Law 
adopted and promulgated in 1994 also drew upon international arbitration 
legislation and practices, especially provisions in the New York Convention 
on the Enforcement and Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“UNCITRAL Model 
Law”) promulgated by the international Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) in 1985.6  This arbitral system exists today for 
the adjudication of the majority of international and domestic commercial 
disputes, and mimicked the western system in its formality and relative 
transparency.7 
 
Within the domestic court arena, however, it has been a different 
matter. 8   This Article focuses on China’s domestic court reforms, 
specifically on its civil justice system.  While criminal justice involves the 
power of the state against individuals, civil justice is where ordinary citizens 
can access the legal system and be the initiators of law enforcement.  A 
robust and fair civil justice system can empower individuals to assert their 
rights and, through seemingly technical rule changes such as in civil 
                                                 
STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO (1999); Stanley Lubman, Bird 
in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty Years, 20 NORTHWEST J. INT’L L. & BUS. 383 (2000). 
4 See Donald Clark, Legislating for a Market Economy in China, 191 CHINA QUARTERLY 567–85 
(2007). 
5  The State Council’s Reply Concerning the Renaming of the Foreign Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission as the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission and the 
Amendment of its Arbitration Rules, LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (June 21, 1988), 
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/tscorctrotfeatacatcieatacataoiar1932/. On December 2, 1986, the 
NPC of China declared it would adhere to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
June 10, 1958. See also SCOTT WILSON, REMADE IN CHINA: FOREIGN INVESTORS AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE IN CHINA 104 (Oxford Uni. Press 2009). 
6  See Zhao Xiuwen & Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Reforming Chinese Arbitration Law and Practices in the 
Global Economy, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 421, 428 (2006).  
7   See The Republic of China Arbitration Law, amended July 10, 2002, effective July 10, 2002, 
http://www.arbitration.org.tw/english/image/Arbitration/Arbitration%20Law%20of%20the%20Republic%
20of%20China.pdf. 
8  See generally Fan Kun, Arbitration in China: Practice, Legal Obstacles and Reforms, 19 ICC INT’L 
CT. ARB. BULL. 25 (2008). 
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procedure rules, can serve as the basis for rule of law developments.  Facing 
problems with overburdened courts and increasing caseloads, Chinese court 
reformers have aimed to secure efficiency and consistency in their systems 
much as any other court reformers. 
 
Yet, even as Chinese court reformers have battled issues of efficiency 
and consistency, they have had to plan their incremental suggestions to 
coordinate them with national goals and identity.  Domestic civil procedure 
and court reforms are more likely to succeed if couched in support of China’s 
changing national goals—first, economic development; then, harmonious 
society; and today, the Chinese dream.  As will be discussed below, Chinese 
court reforms have been timed and shaped in accordance with CCP stated 
national goals in ways that give these reforms a uniquely Chinese flavor, 
rendering them “court reform with Chinese characteristics.”9 
 
II. LAW TO FACILITATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
As an initial matter, the Chinese domestic legal system is structurally 
based on a civil law model borrowed from the German system.10  Internally, 
China’s courts retain aspects of its own centuries-long tradition as a 
bureaucratic empire bolstered by concepts of socialist legality.11  Compared 
to United States courts, Chinese courts have limited authority and, according 
to many observers, judges are more like bureaucratic actors or civil servants 
within a tightly party-controlled hierarchy than independent adjudicators.12  
This led Xiao Yang, then president of the SPC, to lament, “[c]ourts have often 
been taken as branches of the government, and judges viewed as civil servants 
who have to follow orders from superiors, which prevents them from 
exercising mandated legal duties.”13  Until recently, Chinese judges decided 
cases in collegiate panels and controversial decisions had to be approved by 
the court president or reviewed by the adjudication committee (an internal 
                                                 
9  This is a play on Deng Xiaoping’s “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” See DENG XIAOPING, 
BUILD SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS (Foreign Languages Press 1985). General Secretary Xi 
Jinping in the Decision of the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee also emphasized the importance 
of “rule of law with Chinese characteristics,” as keeping to CPP leadership. Id.  
10   See Margaret Y.K. Woo, Justice, in HANDBOOK OF CHINA’S GOVERNANCE AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 
53–66 (Chris Ogden ed., 2013). 
11   See generally LUBMAN, supra note 3; CHINESE JUSTICE, supra note 3.  
12 See KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW GROWTH NEXUS:  RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
250 (Brookings Institute 2007); Vernon Mei Ying Hung, China’s TWO Commitments and Independent 
Judicial Review: Import on Legal and Political Reform, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 77, 124 (2004). 
13  Veron Mei-Ying Hung, China’s WTO Commitment on Independent Judicial Review (Political 
Reform and Legal Project, China Program, Carnegie Endowment Working Papers No. 32), 
https://www.scribd.com/document/113903735/China-s-commitment-on-independent-judicial-review. 
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committee composed of leadership of the court responsible for resolving 
difficult and sensitive cases). 14   This treatment of the judiciary as a 
bureaucracy rather than as an independent institution is not only consistent 
with China’s socialist dictates but also with its historical tradition of 
developing a centralized bureaucracy to govern its population.15 
 
One of the first codes promulgated for the adjudication of domestic civil 
cases was the Chinese Civil Procedure Code, enacted for trial implementation 
in 1982 and then formally in 1991.16  Blending Maoist, socialist, and civil law 
traditions, the civil procedure code emphasized conciliation, rather than 
adjudication.  Under Maoist/socialist thought, domestic civil disputes were 
those in which no “enemies” stood out and therefore were most suitable for 
informal dispute resolution by the neighborhood or mediation committees.17  
This emphasis on conciliation and mediation was also consistent with the 
historic Confucian tradition that placed a preference on harmony.  Thus, 
domestic disputes were often “resolved” by mediation, with formal trials 
being quite rare.  If a case was unresolved by mediation and reached the 
courts, it was resolved using an inquisitorial mode of civil procedure in which 
the court took control of everything from investigation to structuring the 
parties’ claims.18 
 
During this initial period, Chinese judges retained tremendous 
responsibility in civil cases.  As in the inquisitorial system on which the 
Chinese system was based,19 there was judicial rather than party control of 
litigation.  The judge’s broad authority was further bolstered by the Chinese 
                                                 
14   See Xin He, Black Hole of Responsibility: The Adjudication Committee’s Role in the Chinese Court, 
416 L. & SOC’Y REV. 681 (2012). 
15   Francis Fukuyama, The Patterns of History, 23 J. DEMOCRACY 14, 15 (2012). 
16   ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO MINSHI SUSONG FA (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法) [CIVIL 
PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991) [hereinafter CHINA CIV. P. LAW OF 1991], translated 
at http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207339.htm. The 1991 Civil Procedure Law was amended 
in 2007, and again in 2012. See QUANGUO RENMIN DAIBIAO DAHUI CHANGWU WEIYUANHUI GUANYU 
XIUGAI “ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO MINSHI SUSONG FA” DE JUEDING (全国人民代表大会常务委员
会关于修改《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》的决定) [DECISION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE 
NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS ON AMENDING THE “CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA”], http://law.chinalaw info.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=98762. 
17   For a classic article on Chinese mediation during the early reform years, see Jerome Alan Cohen, 
Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1966) (citing Mao Tsedong’s 
famous special on the correct handling of contradictions amongst the people). 
18  See generally CIVIL LITIGATION IN CHINA AND EUROPE: ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE AND 
PARTIES (C. H. van Rhee & Fu Yulin eds., 2014). 
19  For a classic description of the civil law inquisitorial system, see KONRAD ZWEIGART & HEIN KOTZ, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (3d ed. 1998).  
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socialist principle under which a judge is obligated “to seek truth from facts, 
and correct error whenever discovered.”20  There was a belief that litigation 
should be resolved based on an objective truth rather than a legal truth, and 
that litigation should end with a determination of who was truly at fault, rather 
than who had proven their case. 21   Under this approach, the court was 
responsible for collecting, investigating, and confirming the evidence to 
unearth the truth. 
 
The early 1990s saw an acceleration of economic development, 
beginning with the Resolution on Marketization of the Fourteenth National 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.22  Then Premier Deng Xiaoping, 
after a “southern tour” during which he saw how much residual poverty still 
existed in rural China, determined that further acceleration of market reforms 
was imperative.23  For this next stage of economic development, as increased 
economic development spurred greater disputes, China deepened market 
reforms and encouraged the use of the courts.  As will be explained below, 
there were efforts at further court reform and amendments to the civil 
procedure law in 1991 that gave greater importance to the role of courts in 
resolving domestic civil disputes.  In 1997, the Chinese Communist Party at 
its Fifteenth National Congress reiterated a ten-year target for national 
economic and social development that was to be achieved with a basic strategy 
of “managing state affairs according to law” and “build[ing] a socialist 
country ruled by law.”24 
                                                 
20 “Seeking Truth from Facts” is a key element of Maoism, first quoted by Mao Zedong and later 
promoted by Deng Xiaoping as a central ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics. This goal is 
codified in China Civ. P. Law of 1991, arts. 2, 7. See CHINA CIV. P. LAW OF 1991. 
21   CHINA CIV. P. LAW OF 1991 art. 2. See also Zhong Jianhua & Yu Guanghua, Establishing the Truth 
on Facts: Has the Chinese Civil Process Achieved This Goal?, 13 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y. 393, 400–01 
(2004). 
22 ZHONGGONG ZHONGYANG GUANYU JIANLI SHEHUI ZHUYI SHICHANG JINGJI TIZHI RUOGAN WENTI 
DE JUEDING (中共中央关于建立社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定) [NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE 
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY RESOLUTION ON ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMIC 
SYSTEM] (Nov. 14, 1993), http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=7590. 
23 See JIANG ZEMIN (江泽民), JIAKUAI GAIGE KAIFANG HE XIANDAIHUA JIANSHE BUFA DUOQU YOU 
ZHONG GUO TESE SHEHUI ZHUYI SHIYE DE GENG DA SHENGLI (加快改革开放和现代化建设步伐夺取有
中国特色社会主义事业的更大胜利) [ACCELERATING THE REFORM, THE OPENING TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD 
AND THE DRIVE FOR MODERNIZATION, SO AS TO ACHIEVE GREATER SUCCESSES IN BUILDING SOCIALISM WITH 
CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS] (1992), http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2011-
03/29/content_363504.htm. 
24 See JIANG ZEMIN (江泽民 ), GAOJU DENG XIAOPING LILUN WEIDA QIZHI, BA JIANSHE YOU 
ZHONGGUO TESE SHEHUI ZHUYI SHIYE QUANMIAN TUIXIANG ERSHIYI SHIJI (高举邓小平理论伟大旗帜，
把建设有中国特色社会主义事业全面推向二十一世纪) [HOLD HIGH THE GREAT BANNER OF DENG 
XIAOPING THEORY, ADVANCEMENT OF THE CAUSE OF BUILDING SOCIALISM WITH CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS’ INTO THE 21ST CENTURY] (1997), http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/45607.htm. 
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During this period, Chinese reformers encouraged the greater use of 
law and law enforcement by ordinary citizens.  No longer was legal 
informality tolerated. China proclaimed itself “a country ruled by law,” and 
encouraged citizens to enforce the law.25  Economic policies and economic-
related policies were increasingly put into legal form.26  Increased domestic 
market and economic activity required the stability that a legal system could 
provide in setting and enforcing predictable norms.   
 
It is under this setting that Xiao Yang, then president of the Supreme 
People’s Court, took helm to systematize and accelerate court reforms with an 
eye towards increased efficiency and promotion of procedural justice.  
Between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the Supreme People’s Court 
issued several reform documents that placed a greater emphasis on separation 
of functions, professionalizing the judiciary, and on trials and adjudication.  
In June 1998, the SPC promulgated the Several Rules on Civil and Economic 
Trials, which formally placed the burdens of providing proof on the parties, 
rather than on judicial investigation, and allowed for limited discovery. 27  
Additionally, in 1998, Xiao Yang, then-president of the Supreme People’s 
Court, ordered a separation of functions (filing, adjudicating, and supervising) 
and required every court to establish a case filing division separate from the 
trial division.28  All these reforms were bolstered by the Court’s First Five 
Year Reform Program (1999–2003), which placed emphasis on improvement 
of the judiciary and the adjudication process.29 
And so, heightened qualifications for judicial officers were established, 
with a National Judicial Exam to follow.  It was also a time when more 
separation of functions was encouraged.  A case filing division was 
established which was responsible for the more routine tasks of examining 
                                                 
25  Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The Limits of Civil Justice 
Reform in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 25. 
26  See generally Jacque de Lisle, Law and the Economy in China, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE 
CHINESE ECONOMY: LAW AND THE ECONOMY IN CHINA 255–79 (Gregory Chow & Dwight Perkins eds., 
Routledge 2014). 
27 See Guanyu Minshi Jingji Shenpan Fangshi Gaige Wenti de Ruogan Guiding (关于民事经济审判
方式改革问题的若干规定) [Several Rules on the Reform of Civil and Economic Trials] (promulgated by 
the Sup. People’s Ct. Judicial Comm., July 11, 1998) (clarifying parties’ burdens of proof, the trial function, 
and the judicial panel’s responsibilities), http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_for m.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=20 
233; see also Jiang Wei (江伟) & Wu Zeyong (吴泽勇), Zhengju Fa Ruogan Jiben Wenti de Fazhexue Fengxi 
(证据法若干基本问题的法哲学分析) [A Jurisprudential Analysis on Several Basic Issues of Evidential 
Law], 2 ZHONGGUO FAXUE (中国法学) [CHINESE JURIS.] 24, 45–46 (2002). 
28   See RENMIN FAYUAN DIYIGE WUNIANGAIGE GANGYAO (1999–2003) [FIRST FIVE-YEAR COURT 
REFORM PROGRAM (1999–2003)] (Oct. 20, 1999), 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=23701. 
29  Id. 
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and registering cases and appeals, delivering the complaint and other litigation 
documents, appointing a presiding or responsible judge and other members of 
a collegial panel, fixing the date of court sessions, issuing notices, and 
preserving property and evidence before trial. 30   The adjudication panel 
theoretically would not have access to a case file until the case was cleared by 
the case filing tribunal.  The separation of functions was expected to 
streamline the processing of litigation, leaving judges room to preside over 
hearings and be more unbiased in adjudicating cases.31  
 
Later amendments to the civil procedure code also added pre-trial 
procedures during which parties were to exchange evidence.  This, combined 
with a more robust hearing, brought about the so-called two-stage trial 
structure.  The underlying purpose for all these reforms was to increase 
efficiency by scheduling a case for substantive hearing only when it was ready 
and to assure greater impartiality of judges by isolating the trial judge from 
the case until the substantive hearing.32  It was an effort to professionalize the 
judiciary and clarify its functions as court procedures became increasingly 
complex, in part because the judiciary had suffered from inexperience and 
corruption in the past.33 
 
The SPC also set a goal of establishing an open and public trial system 
in an effort to legitimize the work of the courts through increasing 
transparency.  During this period, Chinese reformers wavered between 
promoting judges as independent adjudicators and retaining them as 
bureaucratic actors, as well as between giving greater power to litigants to 
shape their litigation and placing that responsibility primarily on judges.  
Anticipating greater use of the courts from disputes that naturally arise from 
more economic transactions, China experimented with western legal concepts 
and the adversary system.34  The idea was to give more control over litigation 
to the parties in an effort to ease the workload of judges and encourage greater 
party autonomy.35 
                                                 
30   See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Lian Gongzuo de Zhanxing Guiding (最高人
民法院关于人民法院立案工作的暂行规定) [Interim Provisions of the Case Filing Division of the Supreme 
People’s Court] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Apr. 21, 1997), 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=17120. 
31  Nanping Liu & Michelle Liu, Justice Without Judges: The Case Filing Division in the People’s 
Republic of China, 17 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 283, 294 (2011). 
32   See FIRST FIVE-YEAR COURT REFORM PROGRAM (1999–2003), supra note 28.    
33  For a good analysis of the problems associated with China’s early legal system, see generally 
LUBMAN, supra note 3.  
34  Hualing & Cullen, supra note 25, at 25, 46–47. 
35  CHINA CIV. P. LAW OF 1991 art. 13. See also id. at 40–41. 
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By focusing on the parties, dividing judicial functions and 
responsibilities, and professionalizing the judiciary, these changes were 
intended to pave the way for greater transparency, as decisions were rendered 
in open court after exchange of evidence and oral arguments.36  During this 
period, the SPC even introduced western procedural concepts into civil 
justice, such as the burden of proof from the Anglo-American tradition and 
the “principles of oral argument” (Verhandlungsmaxime) from the 
German/Japanese tradition. 37   Concepts such as “due process,” 
class/representative actions, legal vs. objective truth, “equality before the 
law,” “the rule of law,” and “judicial independence,” made their way into the 
conversation in the development of the Chinese civil procedure.38   Because 
of the combined efforts of increased judicial professionalism, procedural 
reform, and the introduction of adversarial proceedings, the mediation rate 
declined steadily from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s.39 
 
But efforts to establish greater legal formality and place burdens of 
proof on the parties only added greater barriers to justice when they were 
instituted without adequate legal assistance.  The number of Chinese lawyers, 
then and now, remains small relative to the population, and most Chinese 
lawyers gravitate towards urban rather than rural areas.40  Where previously 
lawyers had been state cadres employed by the government, the new private 
lawyers steered towards the more profitable practice of corporate and business 
law.41  In some rural areas, lawyers and judges who were legally trained 
remained rare.  The effect was to increase the disparity between rich and poor 
in terms of access to justice.42 
 
                                                 
36  See generally ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN [SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT], SEVERAL RULES ON THE 
MATTERS CONCERNING REFORM OF CIVIL AND ECONOMIC TRIAL METHODS: JUDICIAL EXPLANATIONS OF 
RELEVANT REGULATIONS OF CIVIL EVIDENCE LAW (People’s Court Pub. House 2002). Several Provisions of 
the SPC on the Issues concerning the Civil and Economic Trial Mode Reform were issued in 1998. The Trial 
Methods Rules were issued on July 6, 1998 and effective on July 11, 2002. 
37  Id.  
38  RENMIN FAYUAN DIERGE WUNIANGAIGE GANGYAO (2004–2008) (人民法院第二个五年改革纲 
(2004–2008)) [SECOND FIVE-YEAR REFORM PROGRAM FOR THE PEOPLE’S COURTS (2004–2008)], 
https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/second-five-year-reform-program-for-the-peoples-courts-
2004-2008-cecc#body-chinese. During this period, the SPC acknowledged the need to look overseas in 
designing reforms of China’s courts. 
39 See Hualing & Cullen, supra note 25, at 3. 
40   See generally Fu Yulin, Dispute Resolution and China’s Grassroots Legal Services, in CHINESE 
JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 314. 
41   Ethan Michelson, Lawyers, Political Embeddedness, and Institutional Continuity in China’s 
Transition from Socialism, 113 AM. J. SOC. 352, 365–71 (2007). 
42   Yulin, supra note 40, at 314. 
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Added to this picture was the increasing number of disputes that 
naturally occurred with economic development.  Faced with increased 
workload, as well as professional incentives, some Chinese judges retreated 
behind a veil of legal technicality.43  Cases were dismissed on technicalities, 
or worse, often not accepted at all.44  Rather than face reversals that could 
result in lower pay and diminished promotion prospects, Chinese judges 
preferred to have cases go away rather than adjudicate them.45  Burdened with 
the obligation to assess the complaint substantively at an initial stage but 
relieved of the obligation to investigate, Chinese judges retained great 
discretion in accepting or not accepting cases, and would deny acceptance of 
troublesome or politically sensitive cases without offering litigants a chance 
to argue otherwise. 46   For accepted cases, judges would also push for a 
mediated settlement, which would not be appealed by the parties or protested 
by the procuratorate. 
 
More problematically, courts faced pressure from local government 
intervention, termed “local protectionism.”47  One of the first initiatives Deng 
Xiaoping undertook to stimulate the Chinese economy was to introduce fiscal 
decentralization, in which the central government increasingly cut 
intergovernmental transfers and shed its fiscal responsibilities to lower levels 
of government.48  This has provided local governments with a strong incentive 
to shield local firms and industries from interregional competition, as well as 
to protect state-owned enterprises under their administration.  Such local 
businesses are often a local government’s base of political power, and source 
of fiscal revenue and private wealth.  In turn, courts (themselves financed by 
local governments) were then pressured to exert “local protectionalism,” and 
to rule on behalf of home litigants.49 
 
Initially, as the economy grew, the central government in Beijing had 
high hopes that courts, prompted by disgruntled citizens, could assist in 
                                                 
43   See Sida Liu, With or Without the Law: The Changing Meaning of Ordinary Legal Work in China, 
1979–2003, in CHINESE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 234. 
44   See Liu & Liu, supra note 31, 284–65, 287–88. 
45   See Carl Minzner, Judicial Disciplinary Systems for Incorrectly Decided Cases: The Imperial 
Chinese Heritage Lives On, in CHINESE JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 58. 
46   Liu & Liu, supra note 31, at 320.   
47   Thus, the First Five-Year Court Reform Plan targeted local protectionism as one danger to “socialist 
rule of law.” See FIRST FIVE-YEAR COURT REFORM PROGRAM (1999–2003), supra note 28. 
48  Chunli Shen at al., Fiscal Decentralization in China: History, Impact, Challenges and Next Steps, 
13 ANNALS ECON. & FIN. 1, 10 (2012). 
49  See Judicial Independence in the PRC, CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, 
https://www.cecc.gov/judicial-independence-in-the-prc. 
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reining in local governments and growing corruption.50  Even as courts, faced 
with increasingly complex cases and procedures, retreated behind a veil of 
technocracy, the early 2000s saw more corruption cases involving court 
personnel.  The conviction of Huang Songyu, 51 a former vice president of the 
Supreme People’s Court, and the subsequent investigation of Xi Xiaoming, 
serve as visible examples of alleged judicial corruption at the highest level.52  
As Malcolm Feeley stated in his analysis of court reforms, a high expectation 
for court reform could render any reforms unattainable.  This was indeed the 
case for China.  High hopes and aspirations when confronted with actual 
dissatisfied experiences led Mary Gallagher to term the phenomenon of 
“uninformed enchantment” and “informed disenchantment” in relation to the 
Chinese court system.53  Disgruntled and dissatisfied litigants, failing to get 
satisfaction in the courts, turned to petitioning (xinfang) en mass to Beijing.54  
More threatening to the central state, some petitioners even resorted to 
protesting in the streets.55 
 
 
III. A RETURN TO HARMONY 
 
By the mid-2000s, increased citizen discontent with growing inequality 
due to unchecked economic growth spilled out into social unrest in the streets.  
Just as economic reforms led to greater disparity within the Chinese 
population, so also the reality of greater legal formality without greater legal 
representation led to greater dissatisfaction with Chinese courts.  Litigants 
                                                 
50   Ren Jianxin (任建新), Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao 1996 Nian (最高人民法院工作报
告 1996 年 ) [Supreme People’s Court Work Report, 1996] (Mar. 12 1996), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/07/content_5003526.htm. 
51  China Jails Former Top Judge for Corruption, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 19, 2010, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/19/china-supreme-court-judge-jailed (Corruption cases can 
sometimes be a reflection of the tug between judicial independence and Party loyalty. Notably, Huang was 
famous for issuing the first court decision based on China’s constitution—a ruling overturned soon after 
Huang was dismissed from his post). 
52  Lauren Hilgers, A Chinese Supreme Court Justice Falls From Grace, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 28, 
2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/28/china-supreme-court-corruption-crackdown/. 
53   See Mary E. Gallagher, Mobilizing the Law in China: “Informed Disenchantment” and the 
Development of Legal Consciousness, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 783 (2006). 
54  Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 
103, 103–05 (2006). 
55  Spasms of public anger against perceived injustices or government corruption occur periodically in 
China, but the protest against the cover-up of a teenage girl’s rape and murder, in the seat of Weng’an County 
in Guizhou Province, resulted in thousands of protestors, and fire being set in a government complex and 
police cruisers. In other words, this protest was larger and more destructive than usual. Jill Drew, Anger over 
Rape-Murder Case Sparks Riot in China, WASH. POST, June 30, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/06/29/AR2008062900805.html. 
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flocked to file letters and petitions of appeal to governmental agencies, as well 
as flocked to the streets.56  The Chinese state responded with a combined 
strategy of harmony and populism. 
 
Concerned with threats of social instability, the Chinese government 
launched its next set of policy reforms.  This time, the emphasis was on 
preserving social harmony. 57   Then-President Hu Jingtao announced the 
national goal of preserving a “harmonious society” (和谐社会).58  In his 
government work report delivered at the opening meeting of the Third Session 
of the Tenth National People’s Congress (“NPC”), Premier Wen Jiabao in 
2005 promised that the government would “strive to solve outstanding 
problems vital to the immediate interests of the people, safeguard social 
stability and build a harmonious socialist society.”59 
 
In response, the Chinese legal system resurrected its historical 
preference for mediation over adjudication and its trial reforms blended both 
an effort to ensure “stability at all costs,”60 as well as pragmatic solutions to 
increase efficiency and accountability.  Reminiscent of traditional Confucian 
philosophy, the emphasis was on stability and tranquility, resolving rather 
than adjudicating disputes.  Courts, rather than adjudicate right from wrong, 
were increasingly asked to act as the safety valve for a widening range of 
popular complaints. 61   While court access was theoretically addressed by 
lower court fees,62 and the substitution of a registration system for a filing 
                                                 
56  See Minzner, supra note 54, at 103–05.  
57   See China Publishes ‘Harmonious Society’ Resolution, CHINA.ORG.CN (Oct. 19, 2006), 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Oct/184810.htm. 
58  Maureen Fan, China’s Party Leadership Declares New Priority: ‘Harmonious Society,’ WASH. 
POST, Oct. 12, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/10/11/AR20061011 
01610.html. 
59  Letian Pan, Premier Wen Stresses Building of “Harmonious Society,” XINHUA, Mar. 5, 2005, 
http://www.gov.cn/english/2005-03/05/content_30052.htm. 
60  Social stability at all costs also permeates China’s criminal justice system. See Joseph Kahn, Deep 
Flaws and Little Justice, in China’s Court System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2005/09/21/world/asia/deep-flaws-and-little-justice-in-chinas-court-system.html. 
61    Benjamin Liebman, Chinese Courts: Restricted Reforms, 21 COL. J. ASIAN L. 1, 23–25 (2007). 
62  The Litigation Cost Payment Act (诉讼费用交纳办法), effective April 1, 2007, lowered court fees 
from 4% to .5% to 2.5% of the monetary compensation for cases at the low but raised the rates for upper tier 
cases with disputed property valued at one million yuan. For property valued at less than 10,000 yuan, a flat 
fee of 50 yuan applies. While this enables ordinary citizens to bring litigation, it further divided the courts in 
terms of resources since court fees still constitute a percentage of a court’s finances. 
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system for complaints was proposed,63 Chinese judges were urged to end 
disputes rather than adjudicate them in an effort preserve harmony.64 
 
Chinese courts responded.  Even as prior reforms to professionalize the 
judiciary and to streamline litigation continued, the SPC couched its reforms 
this time in a language consistent with the goal of a “harmonious society.”65  
In 2007, the SPC issued an opinion that instructed the Chinese judiciary to 
“mediate if possible” and to “resolv[e] cases and solv[e] problems to promote 
social harmony.”66  In its Third Five Year Court Reform Plan (2009–2013), 
the SPC noted that “increasing social harmony” was one of its primary tasks, 
and strengthening power restraints and supervision were its focus. 67  
Promoting social harmony for the courts in this instance meant more mediated 
outcomes rather than adjudicating rights in a particular dispute. 
 
During these years, the Chinese government promoted an official 
national “grand mediation” (da tiaojie) campaign, in part to relieve pressure 
on courts and to respond to what was perceived as a litigation explosion.68  In 
2009, Sichuan Province boasted that its mediators (renmin tiaojie yuan) and 
mediation organizations (renmin tiaojie zuzhi) had resolved 527,000 disputes, 
which the government claimed contributed to a 23.5% drop in “mass 
                                                 
63   A case registration system was established this year by the Supreme People’s Court. See Guanyu 
Renmin Fayuan Tuixing Lian Dengji Zhi Gaige de Yijian (关于人民法院推行立案登记制改革的意见) 
[Opinion on the Implementation of the People’s Courts Reform of the Case-filing Registration System] 
(promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Apr. 1, 2015, effective May 1, 2015), 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=246925. 
64   See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Sifa Jianyi Gongzuo Wei Goujian Shehui 
Zhuyi Hexie Shehui Tigong Sifa Fuwu de Tongzhi (最高人民法院关于进一步加强司法建议工作为构建
社会主义和谐社会提供司法服务的通知) [Opinion of the Supreme People’s Court, Regarding the Next 
Step Towards Litigation Development According to Socialist Principals and Harmonious Society], para. 2 
(Sup. People’s Ct. 2007), http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=91949. 
65   See generally THE POLITICS OF LAW AND STABILITY IN CHINA (Sue Trevaskes et al. eds., 2014). 
66  Guanyu Jin Yi Bu Fahui Susong Tiaojie Zai Goujian Shehui Zhuyi Hexie Shehui Zhong Jiji 
Zuoyong de Ruogan Yijian (关于进一步发挥诉讼调解在构建社会主义和谐社会中积极作用的若干意
见 ) [Several Opinions on Further enhancing the Positive Effect of Court-Directed Mediation in the 
Construction of a Harmonious Socialist Society], SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ., at 25 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2007). 
67  Notice, Supreme People’s Court, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Infa 《Renmin Fayuan Desangge 
Wunian Gaige Mouyi (2009-2013)》 de Tongzhi [Qianxing Youxiao] (最高人民法院关于印发《人民法
院第三个五年改革纲要 (2009－2013)》的通知 [现行有效]) [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on 
Issuing the Third Five-Year Reform Outline for the People’s Courts (2009–2013)], http://en.pkulaw.cn/displa 
y.aspx?cgid=114912&lib=law; see also RENMIN FAYUAN DI SAN GE WU NIAN GAIGE GANYAO (2009–2013) 
(人民法院第三个五年改革纲要) [THIRD FIVE-YEAR REFORM PLAN FOR THE PEOPLE’S COURTS (2009–
2013)] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 17, 2009, effective March 17, 2009), 
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show/php?file_id=134421.  
68  PETER C.H. CHAN, MEDIATION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CIVIL JUSTICE: A PROCEDURALIST 
DIACHRONIC PERSPECTIVE 113 (Leiden et al. eds., 2017). 
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incidents” and a 47.3% decline in grievances filed through the petition 
(xinfang) system. 69    That same year, the Chinese government moved to 
stream-line mediation procedures and, on August 28, 2010, the National 
People’s Congress Standing Committee passed the first People’s Mediation 
Law (“PML”), effective on January 1, 2011.70  In presenting the draft law for 
approval in June, Minister of Justice Wu Aiying told the Standing Committee 
that “[m]ediation should be the first line of defense to maintain social stability 
and promote harmony.”71 
 
For disputes that did turn into litigation, Chinese judges resumed their 
active role in case management, particularly for collective action cases that 
had the potential to turn into disorder.  Group litigation was discouraged and, 
if filed, was disaggregated into individual lawsuits.  The idea was to keep a 
close eye on potential sources of local unrest by monitoring these lawsuits and 
preventing them from developing into full-blown social conflicts.  
Accordingly, civil procedure rules were also amended in 2012 to reflect this 
strategy of diverting civil cases through a system of multi-tracking, mediation, 
and disaggregation. 
 
By the time of its Fourth Judicial Reform Plan (2014–2019), the 
Supreme People’s Court identified the completion of “Diversified Dispute 
Resolution” as one of the major aims of the reform.72  Under diversified 
dispute resolution, courts are expected to segregate different tracks for 
different kinds of cases with a renewed emphasis on mediation.73  Judges 
                                                 
69   Pei Zhiyong, He wei gui diao wei xian sichuan quanmian goujian “da tiaojie” gongzuo tixi 
[Harmony Valued, Mediation First—Sichuan Completes Building of “Great Mediation” Work System], 
PEOPLE’S DAILY, Mar. 23, 2010. 
70 PEOPLE’S MEDIATION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (promulgated by Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress, Aug. 28, 2010, effective Jan. 01, 2011), 
http://www.cspil.org/Uploadfiles/attachment/Laws%20and%20Regulations/[en]guojifalvwenjian/PeoplesM
ediationLawofthePeoplesRepublicofChina.pdf. 
71  Zhu Zhe & Lan Tian, Mediation Draft Law Could Ease Tension, CHINA DAILY, June 23, 2010, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-06/23/content_10005555.htm. 
 72  Memorandum, Supreme People’s Court, Guan Yu Ren Min Fa Yuan Jin Yi Bus Hen Hua Duo Yuan 
Hua Jiu Fen Jie Jue Ji Zhi Gai Ge Di Yi Jian (关于人民法院进一步深化多元化纠纷解决机制改革的意
见 ) [Concerning the People’s Courts More Deeply Reforming the Diversified Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism] (June 29, 2016), http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-22742.html.  
73  Id. (The SPC stated that it will “[c]ontinue to promote mediation, arbitration, administrative rulings, 
administrative reconsideration or other dispute settlement mechanisms with an organic link to litigation, 
mutually coordinate and guide parties to choose an appropriate dispute resolution. Promote the establishment 
of dispute mechanisms that are industry-specific and specialized in the areas of land requisition and property 
condemnation, environmental protection, labor protection, health care, traffic accidents, property 
management, insurance and other areas of dispute, dispute resolution professional organizations, promote the 
improvement of the arbitration systems and administrative ruling systems.”). 
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must, in the early stages of litigation, assess and track the case in one of the 
following four ways—if the case has little or no factual disputes (such as in 
debt collection), an expedited procedure (du cu cheng xu, 督促程序 , 
translated loosely as “supervising procedure”) is to be used; mediation is to 
be used if the litigants’ dispute is more substantial, but believed to be capable 
of settlement; otherwise, courts are expected to use simplified procedure (jian 
yi cheng xu, 简易程序) or ordinary procedure (pu tong cheng xu, 普通程       
序), according to the needs of the case; and trial procedure (kai ting sheng li, 
开庭审理) should be used for a case that requires litigants to exchange 
evidence to clarify the points of dispute. 74 
 
Undeniably, these numerous court reforms were motivated by a desire 
to efficiently handle the workload faced by any overburdened court system.  
According to the Supreme People’s Court, the number of court cases rose by 
at least 25% between 2005 and 2009, but the total number of judges (190,000) 
remained almost the same.75  By 2009, civil cases made up 86% of the total 
cases handled by the courts, compared to 12% for criminal cases.76  According 
to at least one observer, recent reforms are a reflection of an “institutional 
pragmatism” on the part of Chinese courts to protect their own institutional 
power by enhancing efficiency.77  Many of the court reform proposals can be 
said to meet any judicial system’s goals of uniformity and efficiency.  Yet, the 
reform methods chosen by SPC were heavily flavored by the national policy 
as identified by the Party at the time.  Although, as Malcolm Feeley suggests, 
incremental changes by the courts themselves must be encouraged, one 
additional factor that has to be taken into consideration is the role of courts 
and civil justice in nation and state building.  Particularly for top-down 
regimes such as China, any reform must be consistent with the national goals 
defined by the CCP, and in this instance, that goal was creating a harmonious 
society. 
 
IV. THE CHINESE DREAM 
 
                                                 
74  CHINA CIV. P. LAW OF 1991 art. 133. 
75  Huazhong Wang & Jingqiong Wang, Courts Hit by Rising Number of Lawsuits, CHINA DAILY, July 
14, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-07/14/content_10102630.htm. 
76  KWAI HANG NG & XIN HE, EMBEDDED COURTS: JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN CHINA 176 
(Cambridge Uni. Press 2017). 
77 See generally Taisu Zhang, The Pragmatic Court: Reinterpreting the Supreme People’s Court of 
China, 25 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2012). 
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Most recently, China has advanced yet another national goal: the 
“Chinese Dream.”  Just after becoming the General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of China in late 2012, Xi Jinping announced what would 
become the hallmark of his administration—that is, the pursuit of “the 
Chinese Dream.” 78   The Chinese Dream, according to Xi, is “the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”  Chinese citizens, President Xi urged, 
should “dare to dream, work assiduously to fulfill the dreams and contribute 
to the revitalization of the nation.” 79   The goal is less about individual 
fulfillment or convergence towards a universal community, and more about 
Chinese prosperity, national glory, and the collective effort towards that goal.  
This inward turn has led to greater “internal repression, external truculence, 
and a seeming indifference to the partnership part of the United States-China 
relationship.” 80   It is an inward turn towards nationalism, an appeal to 
patriotism, and efforts to re-centralize. 
 
Indeed, the “Chinese Dream” means pulling together as a nation, but it 
is also an inward turn for reformers and citizens.  Party leaders have cautioned 
against borrowing institutions wholesale from abroad, focusing instead on 
centralizing and securing China’s increasingly fragmented interests.81  On 
October 23, 2014, the 4th Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party issued its decision concerning “Comprehensively 
Promoting Governing the Country According to Law.”82  While this is not the 
first time the CCP inserted law in its programmatic proposals,83 this is the first 
                                                 
78  Rogier Creemers, The Chinese Dream Infuses Socialism with Chinese Characteristics with New 
Energy, CHINA COPYRIGHT & MEDIA, May 6, 2013, https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com 
/2013/05/06/the-chinese-dream-infuses-socialism-with-chinese-characteristics-with-new-energy/. 
79  Xi urges youths to contribute to “Chinese Dream,” CHINA DAILY, May 4, 2013, 
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-05/04/content_16476315.htm. 
80  James Fallows, China’s Great Leap Backward, ATLANTIC, Dec. 2016, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/12/chinas-great-leap-backward/505817/. In that same 
article, Asia Society’s Orville Schell stated, “In my lifetime I did not imagine I would see the day when China 
regressed back closer to its Maoist roots. I am fearing that now.”  
81  See Chris Buckley, Xi Jinping Assuming New Status as China’s “Core” Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
4, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/world/asia/china-president-xi-jinping-core.html?mcubz=0 
(according to Xinhua, the state run news agency, a meeting of the Politburo, a council of the Party’s twenty-
five most senior cadres reached the conclusion that the key to strengthening party leadership is maintaining 
the centralized and unified leadership of the party center,” and urged officials to support a “staunch leadership 
core.”). 
82  An English translation of the Fourth Plenum Decision is available at http://chinacopyrightand 
media.wordpress.com/2014/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-concerning-some-major-questions-in-
comprehensively-moving-governing-the-country-according-to-the-law-forward/ [hereinafter Plenum 
Decision]. 
83  Since the 11th Party Congress, China has recognized the need for law in a market economy and in 
1999, China acknowledged incorporated the words “rule the country according to law, establish a socialist 
rule of law state” into its constitution. 
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time a CCP central committee devoted an entire plenary session decision 
solely to the topic of law.  More importantly, the Plenum Decision 
unequivocally reaffirmed the centralizing primacy of the Party and the 
national government as the initiator of law.84 
 
Containing both symbolic messages and concrete proposals, the 
Plenum Decision unapologetically outlined the dominance of China as a 
developmental state and the role of the Chinese Communist Party within it.85  
Having studied foreign models in other countries for the last thirty years, a 
more powerful and assertive China is now emphasizing that it will follow its 
own development path to legal reforms and “will not indiscriminately copy 
foreign rule of law concepts and models.”  China, under the leadership of the 
CCP, will be the one to define what is meant by “socialist rule of law with 
Chinese characteristics.” 
 
Chief Justice Zhou, the head of the Supreme People’s Court in 
Beijing, in a recent statement to legal officials, declared, “[w]e should 
resolutely resist erroneous influence from the West: ‘constitutional 
democracy,’ ‘separation of powers’ and ‘independence of the judiciary.’”  
Chief Justice Zhou, a moderate reformer who has strived to professionalize 
the Chinese judiciary in recent years, has bowed to the strict political climate 
that Xi Jinping has established in China in response to rising domestic 
instability. 86  
 
The “Chinese Dream” has resulted in greater constraints on civil 
society, such as stamping out support for an independent press, sharply 
limiting speech on the internet, and urging the reduction of “foreign” 
influences on “socialist law with Chinese characteristics.”87   
 
How much of this inward turn filters down to the individual judge 
level is certainly subject to speculation, as some judges may still continue 
to interact with foreign courts and reference (although never cite to) foreign 
court decisions.88  But the admonition is a reminder that “socialist law with 
                                                 
84  See Plenum Decision, supra note 82.  
85  See id. 
86  Michael Forsythe, China’s Chief Judge Rejects Judicial Independence and Legal Reformers Wince, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/world/asia/china-chief-justice-courts-
zhou-qiang.html. 
87  Id. 
88  Memorandum, Supreme People’s Court, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Zhizuo 
Falu Wenshu Ruhe Yinyong Falu Guifanxing Wenjian de Pifu (最高人民法院关于人民法院制作法律文
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Chinese characteristics” 89  encompasses the leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party and, specifically, the Central Committee of the CCP.  
Operationally, the Plenum Decision openly acknowledges, “in all cases 
where legislation involves adjustment to major structures or major policies, 
it must be reported to the Party Central Committee for discussion and 
decision.”90  While it is common knowledge that most legislation must be 
approved by the Party leadership, this is the first time that the Party openly 
acknowledged and affirmed concretely its role in China’s governance and 
the making of laws.  Further, the Plenum Decision explicitly emphasizes the 
dual structure of the Party-state constitutional order.  China will govern 
according to law (依法治国), but the Party will be governed according to 
its own internal regulations (依规治党). 91   According to the Plenum 
Decision, Party discipline can be more stringent than law.92 
Several major reforms reflect this most recent focus in developing a 
Chinese version of rule of law that would be consistent with today’s “Chinese 
Dream” ideal and its language of nationalism.  While some of these reform 
efforts have roots from before the “Chinese Dream,” they have more recently 
moved front and center, to not only improve uniformity and access in the civil 
justice system, but to attempt to re-centralize control.  Indeed, consistent with 
today’s tone, these measures all seek to recentralize the court system and 
redirect authority back to the central state.  These include efforts to centralize 
                                                 
书如何引用法律规范性文件的批复) [The SPC Reply on How People’s Courts Should Cite Regulatory 
Legal Documents in Making Court Documents] (Oct. 28, 1986), http://www.law-
lib.com/Law/law_view.asp?id=3936. Officially, neither case law nor foreign law is allowed to be cited in 
Chinese domestic judgments. See also Fa Shi [2009] No. 14 (July 13, 2009), 
http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfjs/201002/t20100210_1065.htm. The SPC also formally enacted The 
Provisions on Citation to Regulatory Legal Documents Including Laws and Regulations in Court Decisions 
(effective November 4, 2009), which specified the sources of law that are allowed to be cited in court 
decisions as:  laws and legal interpretations, administrative regulations, local regulations, autonomous 
regulations, separate regulations, and judicial interpretation. See also Benjamin L. Liebman, Innovation 
Through Intimidation: An Empirical Account of Defamation Litigation in China, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 33, 104 
(2006) (In practice, when encountering new or difficult legal questions, lower court judges often consult with 
higher courts for instruction. In the early 2000s, scholars noted some borrowing of legal concepts as in the 
defamation area).  
89  See Plenum Decision, supra note 82. 
90  See id. 
91  See id. 
92  However, to ensure that leaders in all sectors take law seriously, the Plenum Decision anticipates 
that law indicators be written into annual cadre performance evaluations. The Plenum Decision also promises 
a more rule-based order for the Party—party rules will be strengthened and while party institutions, such as 
political legal committees and party cells in the courts, will continue, their roles, authority, and duties will be 
clarified. Interestingly, Party internal rules are highly formal and structured, and some even contain aspects 
of due process protection (“shuang gui” hearing). Xinhua reported on a two-year old campaign within the 
Party system (中央   公厅法规局) to clean up (qingli), or old/conflicting Party rules and regulations.  
December 2017         Court Reform with Chinese Characteristics 259 
funding of the courts,93 develop a uniform case guidance system, and create 
inter-regional courts that hear inter-provincial disputes.  Again, while each of 
these reforms can be said to be necessary for any legal system to ensure 
uniformity and consistency, the features, constraints, and timing of each 
measure are unique to China and dominated by the goals of centralization and 
nationalization. 
 
First, as noted earlier, China’s major developmental strides since the 
late 1970s have been the result of a strategy of decentralization of finances.94  
Under the policy of “eating in different kitchens,” local governments have 
been required to cover their own costs with their own revenues.95  Because 
court funding is derived mainly from the budget of the government at the same 
administrative hierarchal level,96 court budgets have varied greatly, leaving 
courts in less developed regions with budgets that fail to meet minimal normal 
operational expenses.97  Where funding has been scarce, many courts have 
resorted to extra-budgetary funding collected from litigation fees and judicial 
fines imposed on litigants.  Since local courts are financially beholden to local 
governments, local party bosses have also controlled judicial appointments, 
judicial salaries, and promotions, and as a result they have often influenced 
the work of the courts.98 
 
Insufficient court funding has induced judges to engage in “profit 
making” activities, such as collecting arbitrary litigation fees and selecting 
high fee cases; but more concerning to the central government, local funding 
has made courts more susceptible to pressure from local government than to 
central government commands.  Thus, in 2017, in the latest White Paper on 
Judicial Reform of Chinese Courts, the central government identified 
“promoting centralized management of personnel, financial and material 
resources of local courts below provincial level” as one of the major reforms 
needed.99  The White Paper proposes that management of local courts below 
the provincial level be taken away from commission departments at the 
                                                 
93  Xin He, Court Finance and Court Responses to Judicial Reforms: A Tale of Two Chinese Courts, 
31 L. & POL’Y 463 (2009). 
94  Shen et al., supra note 48, at 1–5. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. 
97  He, supra note 93. 
98  See Judicial Independence in the PRC, supra note 49. 
99  China Issues White Paper on Judicial Reform of Chinese Courts, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 27, 2017, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-02/27/content_28361584.htm [hereinafter China Issues White 
Paper]. 
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municipal or county level and placed with the provincial commission 
department with the assistance of the higher people’s court in that region.100 
 
Towards this goal, a centralized funding management system has also 
been explored in which funding for local courts in some provinces, 
autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government 
is allocated in the central government budget and managed by provincial level 
financial departments. 101   These proposed measures would centralize 
funding,102 which in theory would reduce local courts’ financial dependence 
on local government.  Interestingly, while this might free local courts from 
local government influence, it might also increase the power of the SPC and 
provincial high courts who are poised to play a much bigger role in budget 
preparation. 
 
Second, there is now an immediate task to unify and set uniform legal 
outcomes through a case guidance system, established centrally by the SPC.  
As noted earlier, the Chinese legal system is at its base a blend of Maoist-
socialist legal thought overlaid on top of a civil law system.  As in other civil 
law systems, Chinese legislation remains supreme, and unlike the common 
law system, judges are said to apply, not make, the law.  Yet absent a 
precedent system, this has meant that lower courts may have greater leeway 
in interpreting legislation and adjudicating cases.  While individual judges are 
circumscribed by a “collegiate panel” of judges and often supervised 
internally by the adjudication committee, each court may nevertheless rule in 
ways inconsistent with other lower courts and inconsistent with the intent of 
the central government.103  A case guidance system, much like the precedent 
system within common law systems, would allow the Supreme People’s Court 
to unify and “rein in” lower provincial courts, not only through the time-
consuming process of individual appeals, but also through more systematic 
                                                 
100  See id.  
101  See id. See also Decision of the CCCPC on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively 
Deepening the Reform Regulates “Unify the Management of Personnel and Budgets of Courts and 
Procuratorates Below the Provincial Level,” XINHUA, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-
11/15/c_118164235.htm.  
102 See Chine Issues White Paper, supra note 99.  
103  Another experiment in combating inconsistent judgments and local protectionism is the introduction 
of cameras in the Chinese courtroom. See Jerome Cohen & David Wertime, A Crack of Daylight Enters 
Chinese Court Proceedings, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 12, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/12/a-crack-
of-daylight-enters-chinese-court-proceedings-live-streaming-transparency-reform-doubts/. 
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methods such as interpretations and circulars, with publications of important 
cases.104 
 
The idea of “case law,” while not binding, has long existed within the 
Chinese legal tradition, from the dynastic period to the Republican period 
(1912–1949).  Legal cases were compiled to aid imperial magistrates in their 
adjudication of cases.105  With the reestablishment of the legal system in post-
Mao China, in 1985, the Supreme People’s Court began its now-established 
practice of publishing “typical cases” (dianxin anli) in its official publication, 
the Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court.  This work continued in 1999 
when the SPC called for “diligence” in pursuing a system of case guidance.106  
In 2004, the SPC added a new section to publish cases in the Gazette that 
contained legal rules abstracted from each case.107  But it was not until 2005 
that the Second Five Year Reform Plan listed constructing a guiding cases 
system as a policy objective for the Court.108 
 
Chinese legal scholars have debated the merits of adopting a precedent 
system like the Anglo-American system.109  Chinese judges are said to apply 
law, but not to make it as judges do under the common law precedent system.   
The role of the Supreme People’s Court, meanwhile, is to supervise and guide 
the lower courts, not to make new law.110  Thus, the call is for the creation of 
“guiding,” not binding, cases.111  It is significant that it was not until 2010 that 
the present framework of the “case guidance system” gathered momentum 
and took shape.  During that year, the SPC’s Adjudication Committee issued 
the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Work on Case 
Guidance (“Provisions”), 112  and later in 2015, clarifying regulations 
                                                 
104 Susan Finder, China’s Evolving Case Law System in Practice, 9 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 245 
(2017). 
105  See generally DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA (1967); Brian E. 
McNight, From Statute to Precedent:  An Introduction to Sung Law and Its Transformation, in LAW AND THE 
STATE IN TRADITIONAL EAST ASIA 111 (Brian E. McKnight ed., 1987). 
106  See Zhang, supra note 77, at 43–47. 
107  For an excellent historical discussion of the development of the case precedent system, see Note, 
Chinese Common Law? Guiding Cases and Judicial Reform, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2213 (2016). 
108  See SECOND FIVE-YEAR COURT REFORM PLAN OF THE PEOPLE’S COURT (2004–2008), supra note 
38. 
109  See Zhang, supra note 77, at 44. 
110  FAYUAN ZUZHI FA (法院组织法) [ORGANIC LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S COURTS] art. 16 (as amended 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 2006). 
111  See Zhang, supra note 77, at 45–46. 
112 ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GUANYU ANLI ZHIDAO GONGZUO DE GUIDING (最高人民法院关于案例
指导工作的规定 ) [PROVISIONS OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT CONCERNING WORK ON CASE 
GUIDANCE] (promulgated by the Adjudication Comm. of the Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 15, 2010, issued Nov. 
26, 2010), translated in STANFORD LAW SCH. CHINA GUIDING CASES PROJECT, English Guiding Case Rules 
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(“Rules”).113  From 2011, when the SPC first published guiding cases, until 
2017, the SPC has issued close to eighty-seven decisions114 that courts “at all 
levels should refer to . . . when adjudicating similar cases.”115  These cases 
serve to fill in holes in legislation and prior judicial interpretations.  Yet, under 
the Chinese case guidance system, the Supreme People’s Court issues cases 
as guidance which are de facto, if not de jure, binding on lower courts.116  
 
Guiding cases are uploaded to a centralized website run by the Supreme 
People’s Court and are meant to educate and guide lower courts on how to 
handle particular points of law.  Along with model cases issued by the SPC, 
lower courts also began posting selected represented cases online.117  In 2009, 
under the leadership of Wang Shengjun, president of the SPC, the SPC itself 
made a big push to increase judicial transparency in its Third Five Year Court 
Reform Plan by placing a large number of court decisions online.118  As of 
June 2017, close to 29 million lower court cases have been posted.119  While 
the primary motive for putting lower court cases online appears to be a desire 
to curb wrongdoings in the lower courts through greater transparency, the 
establishment of a SPC case guidance system, by contrast, can centralize and 
                                                 
(2015), available at https://cgc.law .stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/08/guiding-cases-rules-
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113  ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GUANYU ANLI ZHIDAO GONGZUO DE GUIDING SHISHI XIZE (最高人民法
院关于案例指导工作的规定实施细则) [DETAILED RULES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS 
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funnel authority back to the central SPC, even as it improves uniformity and 
potentially the quality of court decisions across China.120 
 
Finally, along with the centralizing function of the SPC’s guiding cases, 
the SPC also recently inserted its own physical presence in the provinces in 
the form of circuit courts.  In 2014, the Central Committee Fourth Plenum 
decision announced the establishment of circuit courts as branches of the 
Supreme People’s Court to hear inter-regional cases.121  In its Fourth Plenum 
Decision, the CCP Central Committee mandated that “the Supreme People’s 
Court shall set up circuit courts to handle important and complicated 
administrative, civil and commercial cases of diversity jurisdiction.”122  These 
circuit courts are said to have been launched on a trial basis, but interestingly, 
the creation of these courts was accomplished by Xi Jinping and the Central 
Committee, rather than through amendments of the Constitution or changes 
to the Organic Law of People’s Court.123  This is a bold move since the 
establishment of these new inter-regional courts could serve to federalize 
provincial courts without making legislative changes. 
 
Two reasons were given for the establishment of the circuit courts: to 
bring the SPC closer to the lower level areas and to make it easier for litigants 
to bring uniformity to the legal system.124  The Fourth Plenum Decision states, 
“[b]y moving down the office of the Supreme People’s Court and solving 
disputes at locality, it may provide convenience to the parties in lawsuits, and 
may also allow the Supreme People’s Court to focus on the formulation of 
judicial policies and judicial interpretations, as well as on the trying of cases 
which are of significant guidance for the unification of laws.”125 
 
Certainly, the creation of the circuit courts was in response to increased 
social instability and public dissatisfaction with the legal system, as well as 
concerns about the large number of angry petitioners coming to the SPC’s 
Beijing office.  But more significantly, the creation of the circuit courts took 
                                                 
120  For an analysis of how a court’s appeal process and, in turn, the resulting decisions, centralizes 
authority, see MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS:  A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 39 (1986). 
121  See Plenum Decision, supra note 82. 
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123 Cao Yin, Four Circuit Courts Will Be Added, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 12, 2016, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china////////2016-11/02/content_27246026.htm. 
124  Plenum Decision, supra note 82. 
125  Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues 
Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform (CHINA.ORG.CN), Jan. 16, 2014, 
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fruition at a time when the Central Committee wanted to reassert central 
control and curb local interference by bringing the center closer to the 
localities.  According to the Party’s own documents, the Third Session of the 
Eighteenth CCPCC was focused on professionalizing the judiciary, managing 
courts and prosecutors unified by province level, and separating judicial 
jurisdiction from administrative jurisdiction.126  The Fourth Plenum, however, 
focused on lowering the center of gravity of judicial work, to have more 
disputes resolved locally and conveniently, and letting the SPC headquarters 
in Beijing concentrate on unification of the application of law. 127  These 
circuit courts, as an arm of the Supreme People’s Court, do just that—bring 
central authority down to resolve disputes locally and funnel information back 
to Beijing. 
 
Indeed, one of the stated goals for these circuit courts is to reduce 
interference from local governments.  As a cross-provincial court, the circuit 
court removes inter-jurisdictional cases from local courts which might be 
subject to pressures of “local protectionism.”128  As divisions of the Supreme 
People’s Court, meanwhile, decisions from these newly created circuit courts 
have the authority of the Supreme People’s Court.  As a part of the Supreme 
People’s Court, these circuit courts are powerful enough that provincial 
governments cannot intervene in their verdicts.  Moreover, by having these 
courts hear cases involving national interests, Beijing can be more assured 
that the results will be consistent with what it dictates.  The central control 
gained by these circuit courts will both eliminate local bias and ensure greater 
consistency.  Establishing such courts then helps to reduce power at the local 
level and consolidates it in the hands of central authorities—an effort which 
is also crucial for seeing through the implementation of economic 
restructuring.   
At the same time, these circuit courts can also divert some of the unrest 
back to the provinces by funneling disputes, lawsuits, and petitions to the 
provinces, while all the while collecting information on particular issues for 
consideration at SPC headquarters in Beijing.  They will also serve as a 
platform for judicial reform measures on a trial basis before launching those 
measures throughout the entire court system.  It is the hope of the Beijing 
government that these circuit courts reassert central control, provide 
uniformity, and tangibly represent national authority in the localities.  
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Accordingly, creation of the circuit courts was carried out with lightning 
speed. 
 
On December 2, 2014, the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively 
Deepening Reforms deliberated and passed the Pilot Plan for the Supreme 
People’s Court to set up circuit courts.  On December 28, 2014, the People’s 
Congress appointed the first president and vice president of the First Circuit 
and the Second Circuit.129  In January 2015, the Adjudication Committee of 
the Supreme People’s Court quickly issued Regulations of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Case Trial of Circuit Courts, 
which stipulate, “the circuit courts are the permanent judiciary organs 
dispatched by the Supreme People’s Court.  The verdicts, rulings and 
decisions made by the circuit courts are verdicts, rulings and decisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court.” 130  Each of these courts is empowered to hear 
major administrative cases, and civil and commercial cross-jurisdictional 
cases, as well as petitions within their circuit areas.131 
 
By the end of January 2015, two such courts were already in operation: 
the No. 1 Circuit Court in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, with Guangdong 
Province, Guangxi Autonomous Region, Hainan Province, and Henan (added 
in 2016) in its circuit area, and the No. 2 Circuit Court in Shenyang, Liaoning 
Province, with Liaoning Province, Jilin Province, and Heilongjiang Province 
in its circuit area.132  Four additional courts were added by the end of 2016: 
the No. 3 Circuit Court in Nanjing whose circuit covers Jiangsu, Shanghai, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, and Jiangxi; the No. 4 Circuit Court in Zhenzhou whose 
circuit covers Henan, Shanxi, Anhui, and Hubei;133 the No. 5 Circuit Court in 
Chongqing whose circuit covers Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunan, and 
Tibet; and the No. 6 Circuit Court in Xi’an, whose circuit covers Shaanxi, 
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxi, and Xinjiang.134 
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These circuit courts are responsible for adjudicating major 
administrative cases and trans-regional civil and commercial cases.  As the 
standing local judicial organs dispatched by the Supreme People’s Court, the 
judgments, rulings, and decisions made by these circuit courts have the same 
effect as those made by the Supreme People’s Court.135  As of December 31, 
2016, the No. 1 and No. 2 Circuit Courts had accepted 4622 cases, concluded 
4534 cases, and received 73,000 visitors in total.136  Additionally, these two 
courts have become the “experimental units” and “pacesetters” of some of the 
judicial reforms conducted by the Supreme People’s Court.137  Finally, these 
circuit courts have held meetings with local courts and serve to “guide” 
judicial work apart from hearing the cases themselves.138 
 
China has created more experimental courts, including courts 
specifically directed to administrate cases against local governments.  For 
example, two trans-district courts were created as part of a pilot program to 
resolve administrative cases across city districts.  In December 2014, the 
Beijing No. 4 Intermediate People’s Court and Shanghai No. 3 Intermediate 
People’s Court were given the responsibility of adjudicating major civil, 
commercial, administrative, environmental and resource protection, food and 
drug safety, and certain criminal cases that cross the cities’ different districts.  
The Beijing No. 4 Intermediate Court reported that it accepted 2,893 
administrative disputes in 2016, twice the amount it accepted in 2015—an 
increase attributable to the Court’s strict adherence to accepting appeals 
immediately after registration rather than first subjecting them to an initial 
court review.139  
 
This experiment was extended to the provincial level in June 2015, 
when the SPC promulgated opinions on trans-regional centralized jurisdiction 
over administrative cases.  These opinions instructed certain higher people’s 
courts to, according to respective local conditions, designate some courts to 
exercise jurisdiction over trans-regional administrative cases, to integrate 
resources of administrative adjudication, and to improve the judicial 
environment for administrative adjudication.140  Higher people’s courts such 
as in Fujian, Shandong, Henan, and Guangdong, have assigned jurisdiction 
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over certain administrative cases of first instance to certain designated 
intermediate people’s courts that differ from the courts that typically have 
jurisdiction over such cases (usually the administrative organ where the 
defendant is located).141  
 
As the timetable above demonstrates, with a top-down system like 
China’s, implementation of proposed reforms takes place very quickly.  It 
only took three months to set up the proposed circuit courts, complete with 
the appointment of judges, law clerks, selection of the court sites, and 
coordination with both central and provincial governments.  Planning for 
these courts was likely to have been undertaken long before their 
pronouncements, but the actual implementation did take place with 
astonishing speed.  Yet, while the physical establishment of these courts is 
complete, the more difficult questions regarding their incarnation are the ones 
that Malcolm Feeley asks.  Namely, how are such reforms to be received and 
will routinization take place? 
 
Two obstacles facing circuit courts have already been identified: 
physical hardships and an overwhelming caseload. In their first year, the first 
two circuit courts accepted a combined 1774 cases, which amounts to 70 cases 
per judge.142  But both circuit courts also received more than 43,000 visitors, 
and the No. 1 Circuit Court received 2196 letters.143  The combination of the 
added complexity of cross-province cases and the sheer number of petitioners 
has meant that many judges work overtime and on weekends.  Additionally, 
while today’s transportation options render traveling less physically strenuous 
and the Internet and cell phones have made communication more accessible, 
many circuit court judges resent having to be away from their homes and 
families in Beijing for two years.  Finally, the rotation system means that these 
circuit courts will always be manned by a group of judges who, while 
experienced, are nevertheless new to the locality.144   
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While it is too early to determine whether routinization will take place, 
these circuit courts have already established their priorities.  One of the first 
guidances issued by the No. 2 Circuit Court regarded setting standards in 
tough administrative litigation cases involving local governments.  On August 
4, 2017, the No. 2 Circuit Court issued a set of thirty case summaries on 
administrative cases selected from the many administrative cases heard in the 
first year and half of operation. 145  These cases primarily dealt with challenges 
to local government’s demolition and land taking.146  Although this document 
does not have any formal status, it was approved at a conference of 
administrative judges in Liaoning, Heilongjiang, and Jilin, and the rules it sets 
out are now considered highly persuasive to courts in those three provinces.  
The No. 1 Circuit Court, meanwhile, also recently published an explanation 
of twelve selected case decisions.147 
 
Circuit courts serve an important function.  In addition to centralization, 
these courts are able to collect information at the ground level, ensure 
uniformity, and curb local influences.  They do so both by actually 
adjudicating cases and issuing guidance drawn from the cases adjudicated.    
Additionally, these courts are important because they provide a platform on 
which the Supreme People’s Court can try judicial reforms in an environment 
directly under its control.  Chinese reforms are often carried out first 
experimentally on a smaller scale before moving to a national scale.  Circuit 
courts and the pilot inter-district courts already serve this function.  Judges 
staffing these courts are highly experienced, and they can issue decisions 
without the prior approval of court presidents.  Circuit court judges are said to 
carry out judicial experiments that include seeking to separate the judiciary’s 
adjudicatory functions from its administrative functions, prioritizing the role 
of court hearings, and applying the “case handling responsibility system,” in 
which a single judge, rather than a collegiate panel, takes responsibility for 
deciding cases. 148  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
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In 1983, Malcolm Feeley identified a number of obstacles that stand in 
the way of United States court reform, and his conclusions are still relevant 
today.  The obstacles Feeley identified include the presence of diverse 
constituencies with different and often conflicting expectations of the system, 
unattainable objectives, and the reality that courts lack a central authority or 
unified value system.  In the context of China, the first two of these obstacles 
have been clearly present, but China represented the flip side of United States 
judicial reform problems in two other respects.  Rather than lacking in central 
authority or a unified value system, China’s judicial reforms have faced the 
same problem as all centralized regimes: the problem of governing 
responsively despite changing political winds. 
 
Indeed, as in the United States, expectations for Chinese courts are 
diverse and at times conflicting.  For example, while Chinese courts 
themselves may be more concerned with efficiency and workload, the Chinese 
central government may be more concerned with promoting social stability.  
Chinese reformers also face unrealistic expectations for Chinese courts.  
Chinese courts are expected to simultaneously promote economic 
development, rein in local officials and provide equal individualized justice, 
while at the same time promoting social stability, securing centralization, and 
easing pressures on Beijing.  Such high expectations have led to a period of 
“informed disenchantment” with the Chinese courts. 
Unlike the United States, however, China is a planned, top-down polity 
with a national identity, and Chinese courts are expected to promote national 
goals.  Within a top-down regime, planned change, once mandated, can occur.  
In China, judicial reform plans originate under the Central Committee 
Leading Group on Judicial Reform.  Once accepted by the Politburo of the 
CPC, these preliminary opinions serve as a foundation for multi-year plans 
prepared by the various leading groups on judicial reforms established with 
the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the 
Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of Justice.149  Accordingly, the 
problem facing China is less that of a diffuse polity, but rather one that is 
highly centralized, with each legal institution undertaking institutional 
reforms under the guidance and coordination of the Central Committee 
Leading Group on Judicial Reforms.150 
                                                 
149  Zhong Yang Si Fa Ti Zhi Gai Ge Ling Dao Xiao Zu Jie Xi (中央司法体制改革领导小组解析) [An 
Analysis of the Central Committee Leading Group on Judicial Reform], CAIXIN (Jan. 16, 2014), 
http://china.caixin.com/2014-01-16/100629902.html. 
150  JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 1008 (3rd ed. 2014). 
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As a result, Chinese reforms can both take too long and occur too 
quickly.  If not accepted by the Politburo of the CPC, needed change may 
happen very slowly or not at all.  If change does take place, it will always be 
subject to a regime change, political whim, and the next set of national goals.  
Feeley’s proposed solution for United States court reform was to adopt a 
problem-oriented “rights strategy”: letting the courts themselves solve 
specific problems placed before them through litigation because courts are 
well-placed to identify specific problems and devise pragmatic solutions.  But 
litigation-based strategies have limited effect in China.  Chinese reforms have 
curbed impact-type litigation by disaggregating cases and promoting 
mediation.  And although the SPC can issue judicial interpretations said to fill 
legislative gaps, Chinese court judges do not make law through case decisions.  
In China, many of the problems facing the judiciary are deeply rooted in the 
political-economic system and may not be easily changed by the judiciary 
itself. 
 
Yet Feeley’s litigation- and court-centered proposal does make sense 
for China in a different way, which may be why the circuit courts were 
created.  Chinese judicial reforms have faced the main problem of any 
centralized regime: that of responsive governance.  Here, the center in Beijing 
may be too far removed to correctly diagnose judicial deficiencies.  In addition 
to centralization, the presence of these “branches” of the Supreme People’s 
Court may provide an information funnel for the court to have direct access 
to local legal issues and to interact with local legal communities.  It does, in a 
sense, let the judiciary take information from litigation, even if the litigation 
itself does not create the change.  This was demonstrated by the recent 
promulgation of guidance documents and publication of sample cases by the 
No. 1 and 2 Circuit Courts. 
 
Specifically, Article 8 of the SPC Provisions on Circuit Court Divisions 
empowers the circuit courts to report and transfer back to Beijing any cases 
that have major guidance value.  Article 9 also requires circuit court divisions 
to ride circuit within their region to try cases and receive petitioners.  Getting 
information back to the center is important for a country as vast as China that 
lacks democratic structures of accountability and information funneling.  
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These circuit courts may then serve both to bring the center to the localities 
and, in turn, relay information from the localities back to Beijing.151 
 
In reducing the caseload from the headquarters of the Supreme People’s 
Court in Beijing, these circuit courts free the Supreme People’s Court, 
allowing it to optimize its role and function, and better guide the lower courts.  
According to the Supreme People’s Court annual report, almost every year the 
caseload is more than 10,000.152  Cases heard in 2015 at the Supreme Court 
were up 42.6% compared with 2014, with most cases still heard at 
headquarters in Beijing, rather than in the two circuit courts existing at the 
time.153  However, with the addition of four more circuit courts, the caseload 
of the Supreme People’s Court will definitely be reduced.  This may lead to 
the Supreme People’s Court spending more time on important cases and 
providing better guidance the lower courts, as the United States Supreme 
Court does. 
 
The latest set of Chinese judicial reforms is an effort to unify the 
application of laws in a highly concentrated central government, which faces 
a country with huge local differences and diversity of local interests, cultures, 
and norms.  These changes reflect efforts to centralize and be more responsive.  
The central government needs to have an early handle on cases with national 
import.  But if Malcolm Feeley is correct, the higher the volume of cases and 
the greater the emphasis on efficiency, the likelier it is that these new courts 
will simply process cases to meet stated goals rather than promote real change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
151  Zui Gao Ren Ming Di Yi Xun Hui Fa Yuan Dao Hai Nan Shan Cun Xun Hui Kai Ting (最高法院第
一巡回法庭到海南山村巡回开庭) [The First Circuit Court of the Supreme People’s Court Tour Village in 
Hainan Province], XINHUA, Sept. 02, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/201509/02/c_12819030 8.htm. 
152  Id. 
153  See Susan Finder, Big Data from the Supreme People’s Court, SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT MONITOR 
(Mar. 20, 2016), https://supremepeoplescourtmonitor.com/tag/china-court-statistics-2015. 
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